Legal
GUEST ARTICLE: UK Widens Criminal Law Net Over Corporates In Fight Vs Tax Evasion

The UK wants to hold corporate entities criminally liable for not stopping the "facilitation" of tax evasion, a move which creates all manner of traps for the unwary or even those better informed.
The UK government proposes to hold corporate bodies criminally liable for not stopping the facilitation of tax evasion, adding to moves to make tax evasion - already a crime - a strict liability offence, so that intent does not need to be proven, as has been historically the case under English Common Law. With governments the world over adopting ever tougher measures to stem revenue losses to shore up their own balance sheets, significant alterations to the flightpath of such policy is unlikely any time soon. It remains the view of this publication that the best path for policy is for governments to simplify and reduce tax to reduce the opportunity and incentive for evasion in the first place, while also reducing appetite for aggressive tax avoidance which isn’t, strictly speaking, illegal.
In its consultation paper, HM Revenue & Customs said: "The new corporate offence aims to overcome the difficulties in attributing criminal liability to corporations for the criminal acts of those who act on their behalf. Whilst this consultation refers to the application of the new offence to “corporations”, the draft legislation refers to a “relevant body” to encompass the broad range of legal persons to which the new offence will apply." Clearly, definitions will be crucial in deciding how the law operates in practice.
A law firm specialising in areas such as fraud, regulatory
litigation and various crime cases is Corker Binning. Two
lawyers, Andrew Smith and Danielle Reece-Greenhalgh, set out the
latest developments and some of the associated issues. This
publication is pleased to share these insights and invites
readers to respond.
In a new consultation published yesterday, the government has
outlined the latest incarnation of its plans to hold corporate
bodies criminally liable for failing to prevent the facilitation
of tax evasion. This new consultation has been anticipated ever
since the original consultation in July 2015, which led to the
publication in December 2015 of the first draft of the
legislation. A revised draft of the legislation is annexed to
yesterday’s consultation.
On 11 April, the Prime Minister’s office issued a press release
announcing that the draft legislation was being brought forward
in light of the London Anti-Corruption Summit on 12 May. The
press release also referred to plans for a cross-agency
taskforce, led by HMRC and the NCA, to investigate illegality
arising from the Panama Papers. (For more on the Panama Papers
subject, see here.)
To be clear, the draft law is not a means by which the government
could seek the prosecution of those implicated in the Panama
Papers. The law would, for example, have no application
whatsoever to the type of offshore investment scheme which David
Cameron’s father managed. The law does not expand the definition
of tax evasion under UK law, nor does it criminalise what some
regard as immoral tax avoidance. However, the timing of the
consultation is no doubt calculated to deflect the current waves
of criticism concerning the Government’s broader approach to
combating tax fraud.
What is the offence?
The substance of the offence remains the same as originally
proposed, namely to criminalise corporate bodies which fail to
prevent an associated person from facilitating the fraudulent
evasion of tax, either in the UK or overseas. The offence
utilises the “failure to prevent” model of strict liability found
in section 7 of the Bribery Act 2010, and replicates the
definitions of “associated person” and “relevant body” almost
exactly. The associated person who facilitates a tax evasion
offence can therefore be legal or natural, and can perform
services for or on behalf of the corporate as an employee, agent
or subsidiary.
There are three important differences between the draft law
published yesterday and the draft published in December 2015.
These are as follows:
1. An expanded definition of the circumstances
in which a prosecution can take place of a foreign company for
failing to prevent the facilitation of foreign tax evasion;
2. A restricted definition of the circumstances
in which facilitation of UK tax evasion can occur;
3. A new defence whereby the corporate commits
no offence if it was reasonable not to have any prevention
procedures in place.
The first difference
The offence relating to UK tax evasion facilitation applies to
all companies and partnerships, regardless of whether they are
incorporated or formed in the UK. In contrast, the offence
relating to foreign tax evasion facilitation requires one of the
following:
1. That the relevant body is
incorporated/formed in the UK;
2. That the relevant body is carrying on a
business or undertaking (or part thereof) from an establishment
in the UK; or
3. That any act or omission forming part of the
foreign tax evasion facilitation offence takes place within the
UK.
This third permutation did not appear in the draft law published
in December 2015. Its inclusion in today’s draft law means, for
example, that a Brazilian company, with a business located solely
in Brazil, would be criminally liable in the UK if it fails to
prevent one of its agents performing an act in the UK that
constitutes an offence of facilitating the evasion of Brazilian
tax (e.g. a telephone call in London which facilitates the
evasion of Brazilian tax). On one view, expanding the draft law
in this way simply reflects ordinary principles of jurisdiction
under UK criminal law. However, prosecuting foreign companies for
their failure to prevent foreign tax evasion, especially when
they are not even carrying out any business in the UK, is almost
inconceivable in practice.
Indeed, when one looks at the draft provisions relating to the
facilitation of foreign tax evasion, it is difficult not to feel
a sense of unreality. The draft law states that the tax evasion
must be both an offence under the law of the country relating to
evasion of tax payable in that country and a tax evasion offence
under UK law. In addition, the facilitation of the tax evasion
must be both an offence under the law of the country where the
evasion takes place and an offence in the UK. These provisions
sensibly contain a “dual criminality” protection, which means a
company cannot be prosecuted in the UK in relation to
facilitating a tax offence which would not be criminalised under
UK law. Even so, one has to question the practicality and public
interest in prosecuting companies in relation to foreign tax. A
prosecutor would need to call expert evidence about foreign tax
law, to prove both the evasion offence and the facilitation
offence. Except in the most egregious cases, this is likely to be
an insurmountable hurdle, given the varying (and difficult to
interpret) thresholds of evasion and avoidance created in tax
regimes across the world. Those defending the company would seek
to sow confusion in a jury by turning any trial into an abstruse
debate about foreign law.
The facilitation of foreign tax evasion bears the hallmarks of a
similar provision - section 71 Criminal Justice Act 1993, which
has sat on the statute books for many years but which has never,
to our knowledge, been successfully prosecuted. This section
created an offence of aiding or inducing conduct in relation to
the evasion of certain defined taxes within the EU. To commit
this offence, the evasion itself occurs in the EU (outside the
UK) but the assistance or inducement of that evasion occurs
within the UK. If prosecuting the evasion of EU taxes under
section 71 CJA 1993 has proved impossible over the past two
decades, what prospect is there of this foreign tax facilitation
offence being successfully enforced? It is simply not in the
public interest to create criminal offences which stand no
realistic prospect of being prosecuted in practice. In the vast
majority of cases, where the authorities of a foreign country
have suffered a tax loss, the most pragmatic – and arguably the
more just – solution is to place the culpable suspects on trial
in that foreign country (and if they are in the UK, to extradite
them to the foreign country).
The second difference
The draft law sets out what constitutes the relevant tax evasion
offences alleged to have been facilitated. Unsurprisingly in the
UK, this includes an offence of cheating the public revenue, but
also covers any offence“ consisting of being knowingly concerned
in, or taking steps with a view to, the fraudulent evasion of
tax.” The facilitation of this offence is committed where a
person with the necessary knowledge and intent, aids, abets,
counsels or procures the commission of the offence. The
facilitation is also committed where a person is knowingly
concerned in the commission of the tax evasion offence. However,
a company cannot be criminally liable where the associated person
was involved in “encouraging or assisting the commission of the
offence” - the wording found in the December 2015 draft. This
somewhat woolly language has now been removed, with the result
that the concept of facilitation is now firmly based on
well-established criminal law concepts of accessorial
liability.
The third difference
The draft law provides the corporate with the same defence to
both the UK and overseas offences. To rely on this defence, the
corporate must prove that, at the time of the facilitation, one
of the following applied:
1. That the corporate had in place such
prevention procedures as it was reasonable to have in place;
or
2. That in all the circumstances, it was not
reasonable to expect the corporate to have any prevention
procedures in place.
This second defence was not found in December 2015 draft. It has
no precedent in the Bribery Act 2010. Its introduction marks a
policy shift which gives greater protection to a corporate
suspect. It seems to recognise, quite rightly, that small to
medium entities should not be unduly burdened with creating
compliance procedures if they reasonably perceive the risks of
tax facilitation in their business to be non-existent.
Whilst the guidance elaborates helpfully on how reasonable
prevention procedures might be developed, it has nothing useful
to say about the circumstances in which an absence of procedures
might be reasonable. The devil will be in the detail, of course,
because the reasonableness of the procedures will be determined
by the risk profile of the particular corporate. The consultation
invites respondents to suggest case studies on this point.
Conclusions
There are many statutory and common law offences which
criminalise tax evasion. There are the so-called “professional
enablers” provisions under the Serious Crime Act 2015
criminalising those who facilitate offences including tax
evasion. There are far more serious criminal offences of money
laundering under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, which
criminalise all dealings with the proceeds of tax evasion.
What distinguishes the proposed offence from all of these
existing laws is the stringent obligations it places on
corporates to monitor persons associated with them. The clear
objective of the draft law is to impose on the corporate the
compliance burden of policing its employees, agents and
subsidiaries, with the aim of creating more responsible corporate
citizens, thereby helping to stamp out tax evasion at its source,
or helping HMRC to identify tax evasion it might not otherwise
detect.
Over the past few years, the government has repeatedly said that
it is serious about investigating and prosecuting aggressive tax
fraud. But it also knows how difficult it is to gather evidence
and secure convictions, particularly where the evasion involves
opaque offshore structures. Only last week the House of Commons
Public Accounts Committee lambasted HMRC’s “woefully inadequate”
prosecutorial record.
Given HMRC’s stretched budget, and to improve HMRC’s
prosecutorial record, it is no doubt politically expedient to
criminalise the easier targets - the corporates which fail, even
inadvertently, to prevent the facilitation of tax evasion, and
which may have little appetite for contested criminal litigation.
A cynic would say that business is being asked to bear the burden
of HMRC’s inability to prosecute the true tax evaders. However,
that perspective ignores the raft of other measures, both
domestic and international, that are being planned so as to
bolster the fight against tax evasion, not least the introduction
of the Common Reporting Standard in 2017.
Businesses can take limited comfort from the fact that the
consultation emphasises that they need only act proportionately
to the risks arising in their sectors, so as to develop
compliance procedures which are reasonable rather than
all-encompassing.
However, it is not easy to square that position with the
government’s insistence on criminalising the failure to prevent
the facilitation of foreign tax evasion - a prospect which any
significant multinational business would rightly regard as a
compliance nightmare. For this reason, as well as the significant
legal difficulties of proving the commission of foreign tax
crimes, the authors believe that the offence should be limited to
the failure to prevent the facilitation of UK tax evasion.