Executive Pay
Executive Pay Watch: 10 Years' Change To Private Equity Carried Interest Plans
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A major factor in some parts of the remuneration chessboard has been the performance fees private equity and venture capital funds charge, and what that means for the earnings of managers. When fees are in the spotlight, what has changed to "carried interest" over the past decade?
The following article has been written by Nigel Mills of MM&K, an advisor firm which assists companies to design and implement remuneration strategies. The article examines carried interest in private equity and similar investment enties. Carried interest is a share of any profits that the general partners of private equity and hedge funds receive as compensation regardless of whether they contribute any initial funds.
This is also part of our continued commentary on executive
remuneration and governance topics. The editors are pleased to
share these views; we welcome reactions. Email tom.burroughes@wealthbriefing.com
or jackie.bennion@clearviewpublishing.com.
The usual editorial disclaimers apply.
Many will have read about the extraordinary level of activity
that we are seeing in both the private equity and venture capital
industry in the UK over recent months. According to reliable
statistics, the global value of deals carried out by private
equity firms is set to surpass $1 trillion for the first time
this year. Investors in PE funds continue to put money into this
asset class, leaving the global industry sitting on circa $3.3
trillion of uninvested cash (or “dry powder” as it is commonly
referred to). In the UK alone, it is reported that 517 deals have
already been completed this calendar year with an aggregate deal
value of £51.6 billion ($70.9 billion), making 2021 already the
highest deal value size in the last seven years, with four months
still to go.
Not only has deal activity reached unprecedented levels, so have
new entrants into the market both in terms of new investors and
new fund managers.
It is interesting to hear that Nest, one of the UK’s largest
workplace pension schemes, has announced a £1.5 billion private
equity investment strategy in what is being hailed as the biggest
move by a UK defined contribution pension fund into the asset
class.
Last month, the Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Chancellor
Rishi Sunak issued a call to action to UK Pension funds to put
more of their cash into long-term investments such as private
equity and infrastructure.
DC pension funds have until now steered clear of private equity,
partly because the performance fees that PE fund managers charge
would put them at risk of breaching the 0.75 per cent charge cap
on retirement savers’ fees. But earlier this year, the government
loosened the annual charge cap making it easier for DC pension
funds to accept the performance fees that are commonplace in the
asset class.
It is interesting to observe that through all this activity and
growth in private equity as an asset class, the one thing that
seems to have remained pretty constant throughout is the size and
structure of the performance fees that PE and VC fund managers
are charging to their investors, their LPs, whether they be
pension funds, university endowments, family offices or sovereign
wealth funds.
The standard performance fee (or carry) that is charged by a
direct investing private equity or venture capital fund manager
on the funds that it manages in this asset class remains at 20
per cent, as it was right at the outset of the private equity
industry forty or so years ago. What does this mean? In summary,
what it means is that once a fund has returned all its invested
capital, plus a hurdle rate of return (typically per cent per
annum), to the investors in it, then 20 per cent of all the
proceeds received by the fund after that point go to the fund
manager, and actually slightly more than that if there is a
catch-up mechanism.
A quick example illustrates the point. If an independently-owned
PE fund manager raised and invested a £500 million fund and this
fund generated a net return of two times money, the gain on that
fund would be £500 million. Out of this “net profit” that has
been generated, and assuming the hurdle IRR has been met – which
one would expect that it would be given the 2 x money multiple
achieved – the performance fee would be calculated at £100m (20
per cent of the £500 million).
In most funds, the performance fee is shared out among the
partners and the other senior investment professionals of the
fund management entity. In this way, it is in effect their
long-term incentive to maximise the returns to their investors.
In this guise it is typically referred to as a carried interest
plan. While the way in which the carry is calculated has not
really changed in forty years, the way in which it is shared out
has changed, particularly over the last ten years.
Looking back at our Private Equity Survey results over
the last ten years, it is apparent that the way in which these
performance fees have been shared out among the team has shifted
quite a bit.
In our 2010 UK and Europe Private Equity survey, 75 per cent of
the "carry" typically went to the partners in the firm. In the
US, this figure was 79 per cent. In our 2015 Surveys, 68 per cent
of the carry went to the partners in UK/European houses, whereas
in the US this figure had fallen to 76 per cent.
In our most recent surveys (2020) the percentage share of the
carry going to the partners in European/UK houses had fallen to
61 per cent, whilst in the US this figure had fallen to 69 per
cent. In terms of carry allocations, these are really quite
sizeable shifts downwards for the partner level incumbents.
We believe that there are three main reasons for this:
1. Private equity firms have grown much larger over the years and
the ratio of non-partner investment professionals to partners has
increased quite a bit. In other words, there are relatively more
non-partner investment manager mouths to feed through the carry
plan than there were ten years ago.
2. The partners in these firms have recognised over time the
importance of incentivising and rewarding their more junior
talent, in particular the talent which is going to become the
next generation of partners in the firm. Accordingly, they are
needing to award greater amounts of carry to their investment
directors and vice presidents to keep them happy and motivated
and feeling that they are really wanted in the business. It is
the most important retention tool that these firms have for these
investment professionals.
3. There has been a small shift towards awarding more carry to
the senior back-office functions. This has been partly in
reflection of the fact that more and more PE investment firms are
now bringing in chief operating officers and dedicated chief
finance officers and heads of IR, whereas in older times these
functions were often carried out by one or two of the senior
investment partners themselves. There has though also been a
recognition that these roles are extremely important and valuable
in these firms and they deserve an allocation of carry in their
own right. In fact, in order to recruit and retain the best
talent in these roles, carry needs to be offered to them. The
statistics show that more of these roles are being awarded carry
than they were ten years ago.
If you would like further information or have any questions about
the design of carried interest plans or the issues raised in
connection with them in this article, please contact Nigel
Mills.
About MM&K
MM&K is a leading independent advisor and assists companies
to design and implement remuneration strategies, which support
their values, culture and business plans. We operate across a
wide range of sectors and have particular strengths in oil and
gas, investment management (including private equity, venture
capital and hedge funds), retail, media and construction.
MM&K is able to provide global remuneration advice as part of
its membership of the Global Executive Compensation and
Governance Network GECN. MM&K is a member of the Remuneration
Consultants Group and has signed up to its code of conduct.
Nigel Mills, author of this article, can be reached here: nigel.mills@mm-k.com The firm can be also reached via mm-k.com