Alt Investments
Using Secondaries To Build Positions In Attractive Names
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The secondaries market for private assets is an important element of liquidity and price efficiency. A panel
After the Family
Wealth Report Family Office Investment Forum, held earlier
this month in New York City, we continue to carry reports of the
panel discussions of the major themes. In the following
account, panelists looked at private market “secondaries” – i.e.
buying and selling pre-existing private investment stakes.
Secondaries are an important way for the market to achieve more
liquidity.
Maxime Seguineau, founder and managing partner of Raido Capital
Partners, was the moderator for the panel. She was joined by
Kelly Han, investor, The Gate Technologies Capital, and Will
Snape, who is co-founder and head of capital formation, OPEN VC.
Venture secondaries have moved from a niche liquidity tool to a
central part of private market structure. As companies stay
private longer and traditional exit pathways prove less reliable
than they once were, secondaries have become the mechanism that
keeps capital, ownership, and incentives moving through the
system.
That shift was at the heart of our recent discussion at the
Family Wealth Report Forum in New York on April 9. 2026.
Our panel of investment professionals discussed how to use
secondaries to build positions in attractive private companies.
Our conversation was not about whether the market matters
anymore. That question has largely been answered by
scale.
Industry Ventures estimates that the global venture secondary
market surpassed roughly $120 billion in 2025, while Carta
reports $61.1 billion in VC secondary transaction value over the
12 months ending June 2025.
The more relevant questions now are where the best opportunities
sit, how investors should underwrite them, and why specialization
is becoming more important as the market institutionalizes.
Secondaries have become a core liquidity
channel
The secondary market exists to transfer ownership of
already-issued shares from one holder to another. In
venture-backed companies, that can mean employees selling stock,
early investors taking liquidity, funds repositioning portfolios,
or LPs selling fund interests before a portfolio fully matures.
Our panelists noted that these transactions now span direct
secondaries, tender offers, GP-led deals, and fund interests,
reflecting a much broader and more structured market than many
investors still assume.
What changed is not just the form of transactions, but their
importance. The venture ecosystem has stretched in duration.
Companies that once might have exited sooner now can remain
private for longer, often with substantial private financing
support.
Panelists described this dynamic clearly: the surge in primary
venture fundraising allowed companies to defer the public
markets, which in turn increased the need for alternative
liquidity options for employees and investors.
That is why secondaries increasingly function as a release valve.
They provide a way of returning liquidity to early
stakeholders without forcing a company into an IPO or sale before
it is ready.
They also give new investors another path into strong companies
when primary allocations are limited or unavailable. In that
sense, secondaries are no longer just a workaround.
They are becoming part of the normal operating architecture of
private markets.
The rise of secondaries reflects a deeper market
reality
A market does not scale toward $120 billion globally unless it is
responding to a real structural need. In venture, that need is
straightforward: more shareholders are waiting longer for
liquidity, and more capital is locked in assets that do not yet
have natural exit windows.
As I noted on the panel, Industry Ventures explicitly links the
growth of the market to the continued lack of exits from IPOs and
M&A, which has created a backlog of shareholders and LPs
seeking liquidity.
This is an important distinction. The growth of secondaries
should not be interpreted simply as a symptom of stress. It is
also a sign of maturation. As private markets grow in size and
complexity, ownership transfer mechanisms become more necessary,
not less. A more developed private market should have multiple
paths for liquidity, including structured secondary
transactions.
That said, growth alone does not make the market easy. The
private secondary market remains fundamentally different from
public markets. Our panelists agreed that there is no centralized
infrastructure, limited standardization of disclosures,
negotiated pricing, and sometimes very little information
provided to prospective buyers. Those frictions make the market
more opaque, but they also create the conditions for
differentiated underwriting.
The market is larger, but attention is
concentrated
One of the most important ideas in the panel discussion was that
growth in the market does not mean opportunity is evenly
distributed. In practice, a disproportionate amount of investor
attention tends to concentrate around a relatively small group of
highly visible private companies. Those names often attract the
deepest buyer interest, the most broker activity, and the
strongest signaling effects from prior financings or public
comparables.
That dynamic matters because crowded demand can narrow the
opportunity set. When too many buyers pursue the same names,
pricing can become more efficient, seller expectations rise, and
the margin for error shrinks. The result is a paradox: the
companies that feel safest or most familiar may not always offer
the most compelling entry points. In a negotiated market,
popularity can work against return potential.
This is where the conversation becomes more nuanced. The right
takeaway is not that well-known companies should be avoided
categorically. It is that investors need to distinguish between
quality and crowding. A great company can still be a poor trade
if pricing already reflects consensus enthusiasm. In a market
with fragmented supply, uneven information, and bespoke
transaction processes, the best risk-adjusted opportunities often
emerge where fewer people are looking with discipline.
Why the real opportunity may sit beyond the obvious
names
That leads to what may have been the central thesis of the panel:
alpha in venture secondaries may increasingly come from going one
layer deeper. Rather than focusing only on the most obvious
private “blue chips,” investors may find better opportunities in
the broader universe of high-quality companies that are
institutionally relevant but less crowded.
This idea matters for several reasons. First, outside the top
tier of heavily trafficked names, there may be more pricing
dispersion. Second, seller motivation may be more varied and less
intermediated. Third, buyer competition may be lower, allowing
disciplined investors to underwrite with less pressure to
overpay. None of that guarantees superior returns, but it does
create the possibility of finding mispricing in ways that are
harder to achieve in the most consensus-driven trades.
The distinction is subtle but important. The opportunity is not
necessarily in lower quality. It is in better selectivity. In
other words, access by itself is not an edge. Differentiated
access to the right opportunities, paired with disciplined
underwriting and patience, is the real edge.
For many allocators, that is a useful reframing. The question is
no longer simply whether to allocate to venture secondaries. It
is whether a manager has the sourcing network, pricing
discipline, and structural expertise to find value outside the
most obvious market hotspots.
Execution is where the category gets
interesting
If venture secondaries were easy to underwrite, the market would
likely be more efficient than it is. What makes the category
compelling is precisely what makes it difficult. Buyers are not
just evaluating a company. They are evaluating a transaction.
That starts with structure. Even when two transactions appear
similar on the surface, their legal and economic realities can be
meaningfully different.
Then there is the question of access and mechanics. Private
companies may have transfer restrictions, rights of first
refusal, consent requirements, or other governance features that
affect execution. In some cases, information may be limited or
highly asymmetrical. In others, pricing may be shaped as much by
seller urgency as by company fundamentals. The panelists noted
that negotiated pricing and inconsistent disclosures are defining
features of the private secondary market, and that means buyer
judgment matters enormously.
This is why a sophisticated secondary investor must underwrite
more than headline company quality. The real diligence framework
also includes who is selling, why they are selling, what rights
attach to the shares, how the transaction gets approved, what the
likely path to liquidity looks like, and whether the purchase
price properly reflects all of those variables. The best
investors in this space do not just source supply. They convert
complexity into informed decisions.
As the market institutionalizes, specialization matters
more
A common assumption is that when a market grows, edge becomes
less dependent on specialization. In venture secondaries, the
opposite may be true. As the category attracts more capital and
more participants, the premium on real expertise may rise.
That is because larger markets do not automatically become
simpler. They often become more competitive in the obvious areas
while remaining structurally complex in the less obvious ones. As
more buyers enter the space, crowded trades become even more
crowded. The edge then shifts toward investors who can navigate
the hard parts better: sourcing overlooked opportunities,
understanding transaction structure, evaluating seller context,
and maintaining pricing discipline.
For allocators, that puts manager selection at the center of the
discussion. Exposure to the category alone is not enough. The
more important question is what kind of exposure one is getting,
through what process, and with what underwriting framework. In a
market where the same headline company can trade at different
implied values depending on seller, timing, rights, and process,
strategy design matters as much as market access.
That might have been the most durable takeaway from our
conversation.
Institutionalization does not eliminate alpha. It changes where
alpha lives. In venture secondaries, that increasingly means
specialization over generalization, process over momentum, and
disciplined access over broad enthusiasm.
About the panelists.
Maxime Seguineau is a financial entrepreneur and private
investor with expertise across capital markets, technology, and
alternative investments. He is MP at Raido Capital Partners,
which he co-founded to back financial software and AI-enabled
services firms with structured growth equity. Previously,
Seguineau was managing director at Seaport Global, where he
co-founded and led Axegine, an AI-driven systematic credit hedge
fund. He also served as a credit portfolio manager at Millennium
Management and was the CEO and founder of Antepo, a real-time
collaboration startup he sold to Adobe. Seguineau sits on the
board of Sterling Trading Technology and he holds degrees from
University of Chicago (MBA), Bocconi University (MS), as well as
Sciences Po (BS), and is a CAIA Charterholder.
Will Snape is a co-founder and the head of capital formation at
OPEN VC. In his current role, Snape oversees the entire lifecycle
of capital deployment, from deal origination to managing
sophisticated relationships with General Partners (GPs) and
portfolio company leadership. Prior to co-founding OPEN VC, Snape
spent his career in tech, most recently at Google and previously
in a leadership capacity at an AI startup. Snape holds a BA in
urban studies and formal organizations from Trinity
College-Hartford.
Kelly Han is an investor at The Gate Technologies Capital, a New York–based direct tech secondaries firm, spun out of and anchored by a family office. Han holds a BA from the University of Chicago.