The eruption of protests and demands for government reform across the Middle East – most recently in Libya and Bahrain – brings with it serious risk of economic disruption in a number of states, warns Exclusive Analysis, a specialist intelligence company forecasting political and violence risks.

In a new report, Game-Changer Scenarios – Middle East & North Africa Civil Unrest and Political Stability, the firm assesses the risks and likely outcomes in Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

While a number of these states have figured in “frontier market” investment portfolios or - as in the case of Bahrain - been mentioned as wealth management growth areas in recent years, the sudden outbursts of demands for political and other freedoms in recent weeks has acted as a wake-up call to investors. The recent protests in Egypt and Tunisia, for example, have prompted fears about the impact on markets, such as the oil market.

“It is highly likely that the new governments which appear, and indeed old ones that survive, will adopt policies which more closely reflect the needs and aspirations of their populations. However, this will not necessarily or likely translate into greater political freedom. Elites will rely less on US support and will be near certain to seek better commercial terms for oil exports, manipulating deals with China where possible to shift the global oil market. In the longer term (one year) the emergence of 'Arab Resource Nationalism' is very likely,” the report, authored by Zaineb Al-Assam, head of Middle East and North Africa forecasting at the firm, said.

The Exclusive Analysis report made the following assessments on the seven countries in its list:

Algeria: Violent protests are expected to be ruthlessly suppressed, leaving a military-dominated regime in charge. The transition would involve moderate violence and disruption. In the long-term the commercial risk environment is largely unchanged.

Commercial Risks: Protesters will likely fail to block main roads like the East-West highway, though road blockade risks will be greater in Kabylie. Visitors to hotels near protest areas, for example the Sofitel on Rue Hassiba Ben Bouali, will likely experience disruption, but foreign companies in Hydra district will be unaffected.

Bahrain: There is a moderate risk of an extremely violent transition, with a high likelihood of external Saudi and (more covert) Iranian intervention. There is a significant probability that the present order is completely overthrown and replaced by a new order which aligns itself with Iran and therefore negates most previous commercial risk assumptions.

Commercial Risks: Protests will affect transport to and from the capital, causing disruption to shipping at the Port of Mina Salman; the stock exchange is likely to close temporarily.

Iran: Violent protest is already underway but is unlikely to become more violent i.e. armed. A new government will remain proudly Persian and support a civil nuclear programme, and the Shia clerical establishment will have a prominent role.

Commercial Risks: The major shipping hub Port of Bandar Abbas is likely to be effectively shut down by protests; operations at the Port of Nowshahr near Tehran are also likely to be disrupted.

Jordan: There is a high risk of a very violent transition phase, as well-armed and disunited tribes and Palestinians contest control over the distribution of limited state resources. However, Jordan is likely to end up essentially where it started, with the Palestinians largely excluded and some version of the monarchy in power.

Commercial Risks: Major highways are likely to be blocked by protesters; access to ports and airports is likely to be restricted, disrupting shipping and travel. Strikes due to the heavy influence of the Palestinian workforce are likely. A change in regime will raise expropriation risks for businesses connected to the ruling family and its allies.

Libya: Whilst repression of protesters will be harsh, transition is likely to be lengthy. There is no obvious opposition leader and the military is not an independent power base in its own right, as it is in Egypt. However, the outcome for businesses would simply be new persons with whom to do business, as Libya's appetite for foreign direct investment will likely persist.

Commercial Risks: Major roads in Tripoli and Benghazi are likely to be blocked by protesters, effectively closing down ports and airports for several days.

Saudi Arabia: The major issue is succession, which regional events will likely accelerate, quite plausibly to a mid-level Islamist military officer, though there is also a risk of national fragmentation. Transition scenarios are likely to be physically less violent and disruptive, though the end-game may well be radically different and totally exclude the Al Saud.

Commercial Risks: Eastern ports with significant oil infrastructure, including King Abdul Aziz Port, Ras Tanura Port, Ju'aymah Crude and LPG Terminal, and Jubail Commercial Port, are likely to receive increased security, but will likely experience disruption and delays in the event of escalating protests restricting access to the ports.

Yemen: The defection of key tribal leaders will significantly reduce the chances of President Saleh's survival.

Commercial Risks: In all scenarios operations in Aden are most likely to be disrupted as the government tries to put down protests in the south. There is a small risk that if the south attempts to secede, the army will bombard facilities in the south such as Aden port or the Balhaf terminal as a last ditch attempt to prevent secession.