Trust Estate
One Step Removed – New Perspectives From Recent Cases
The landscape of trustee removal is evolving, with courts taking a more nuanced and holistic approach, the author of this article says. Courts increasingly focus on practical outcomes and the health of trust relationships.
In this, the sixth and final article in a series from Roman Kubiak, a partner and head of private wealth disputes at law firm Hugh James, the author examines trustee removal applications in the context of onshore and offshore trusts. (See the first and second and third and fourth and fifth articles in this series.) The editors are pleased to share these insights; the usual editorial disclaimers apply to views of guest writers. To comment, email tom.burroughes@wealthbriefing.com and amanda.cheesley@clearviewpublishing.com
Trustee removal has always been a sensitive area of trust law,
touching on fundamental principles of trust administration and
the court's inherent jurisdiction to intervene. Recent cases have
brought new perspectives to this long-standing issue, refining
our understanding of when and how trustees can be removed.
Trustee removal generally arises via one of three mechanisms:
1. statute;
2. common, or case, law; and
3. the trust instrument.
In the offshore trusts world it is more common to see express
provisions for trustee removal in the trust instrument although
there is statutory provision, for instance under article 19 of
the Trusts (Jersey) Law 1984 and section 18 of the Trusts
(Guernsey) Law 2007.
In the UK, the power of appointment (which generally is also
taken to include a power of removal), is most often governed by
section 36 of the Trustee Act 1925, subsection 1 of which
states:
“Where a trustee, either original or substituted, and whether
appointed by a court or otherwise, is dead, or remains out of the
United Kingdom for more than twelve months, or desires to be
discharged from all or any of the trusts or powers reposed in or
conferred on him, or refuses or is unfit to act therein, or is
incapable of acting therein, or is an infant, then, subject to
the restrictions imposed by this Act on the number of
trustees,-
(a) the person or persons nominated for the purpose of appointing
new trustees by the instrument, if any, creating the trust;
or
(b) if there is no such person, or no such person able and
willing to act, then the surviving or continuing trustees or
trustee for the time being, or the personal representatives of
the last surviving or continuing trustee;
may, by writing, appoint one or more other persons (whether or
not being the persons exercising the power) to be a trustee or
trustees in the place of the trustee so deceased remaining out of
the United Kingdom, desiring to be discharged, refusing, or being
unfit or being incapable, or being an infant, as
aforesaid.”
While most of the grounds for removal under this section are
self-explanatory, what constitutes unfitness is generally
determined on a case-by-case basis but can include insolvency,
allegations of fraud or a complete breakdown of relationships. In
cases of doubt, however, the court also has power to remove
trustees under section 41 of the Trustee Act 1925 and under its
inherent jurisdiction.
One of the key cases often cited is the Privy Council decision in
Letterstedt v Broers [1884] UKPC 1 where it was said
that:
“If it appears clear that the continuance of the trustee
would be detrimental to the execution of the trusts, even if for
no other reason than that human infirmity would prevent those
beneficially interested, or those who act for them, from working
in harmony with the trustee… It is quite true that friction or
hostility between trustees and the immediate possessor of the
trust estate is not of itself a reason for the removal of the
trustees. But where the hostility is grounded on the mode in
which the trust has been executed, where it has been caused
wholly or partially by substantial overcharges against the trust
estate, it is certainly not to be disregarded”.
It is clear that this authority applies in various offshore
jurisdictions. For instance, this was affirmed in Jersey in
Trilogy Management Limited v YT & Ors [2014] JRC 214 and
in Guernsey in In the Matter of the K Trust Guernsey
Judgment 31/2015.
Reasons to remove trustees are many and various, but include:
1. Ensuring the proper administration of the trust where
there was dispute between the trustees (Angus v Emmott
[2010] EWHC 154 (Ch)).
2. Where the trustee has committed a breach of trust.
3. Where the trustee has breached the self-dealing rule
(Walker v Walker [2007] EWHC 597 (Ch)).
4. Where the trustee moved abroad permanently.
5. Where the trustee was in conflict with the trust (Re
Wippell [2018] EWHC 730 (Ch)).
6. A refusal to act.
In Jersey, the court set aside an appointment of a trustee in the
case of Jasmine Trustees Ltd v L [2015] JRC 196, also
known as Re Piedmont Trust, on the basis that the appointor had
failed to have regard to relevant matters and had had regard to
irrelevant matters.
In the unreported 2017 decision of In the Matter of Various
Trusts the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands addressed the
issue of a "paralysed trustee." There, several family
members were beneficiaries of Cayman law-governed trusts.
The trusts held assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars
through various corporate structures and the US Government
alleged that some assets were linked to money laundering and
initiated forfeiture proceedings.
The existing trustee felt unable to act or resign due to
potential accusations of involvement in money laundering.
The plaintiffs therefore sought court orders to replace the
existing trustee with a new Cayman trustee and the proposed
substitute trustee was willing to intervene in the US proceedings
to protect the assets.
There, understandably, the existing trustee didn’t oppose the
application but couldn't consent to it.
The court considered sections 10, 12, and 64 of the Cayman
Islands Trusts Law (2011) which provide the court with powers to
appoint new trustees when expedient or necessary.
In reaching its decision, the court’s focus was very much on the
welfare of the beneficiaries and the ongoing effective
administration of the trust and ultimately found it expedient to
appoint a new trustee to protect the assets and beneficiaries'
interests.
That said, reported decisions are relatively scant because such
disputes generally tend to lead to trustees agreeing, whether
willingly or begrudgingly, to retire.
Rightly so, the bar to remove trustees is high, and the courts
will tend to examine all the facts and reasons, particularly
where only several of the beneficiaries are in favour of
removal.
This high bar was highlighted in the Bermudan case of In the
Matter of the X Trusts [2018] SC (Bda) 56 Civ (12 July
2018) which was an application by corporate trustees for
directions on whether they should remain in office following
submission by one faction of two-family groups of beneficiaries
that the directors of the corporate trustees should be
removed.
In short, they took objection to a proposed plan by the corporate
trustees regarding the management of the family trusts through a
single group of four trust companies. The court emphasised its
inherent supervisory jurisdiction to remove trustees for the
welfare of beneficiaries. It was held in that case that the
court has no direct jurisdiction to remove directors from
corporate boards; only the shareholders could do that. Akin to
“non-binding guidance” which the court can provide and which I
have previously discussed in the context of trust blessing
applications, the court could, though, indicate if it would be in
the best interests of the trusts for the directors to resign,
assuming they agreed to be bound by such an indication.
Ultimately the court found that there was no basis for removing
the trustees or indicating that the directors should resign and
that, while there were criticisms of the trustees' procedures,
that, and the alleged loss of confidence in the trust
administration, did not warrant removal of the trustees.
That approach has been adopted similarly in the Isle of Man,
Jersey and Guernsey, albeit in the context of protectors.
However, given their fiduciary role, the same approach would
apply to trustees. In the 2015 decision of the
Matter of the K Trust the Gurnsey court was referred to
the competing decisions of Re Papadimitriou [2004] WTLR
1141 in the Isle of Man, where the court held that it would “only
remove a protector when it was essential to prevent a trust
failing,” and the Royal Court of Jersey in the 2012 case of
A Trust which cited the principles in Letterstedt.
The Guernsey court preferred the Jersey court’s approach and,
while noting that the power of removal should not be exercised
lightly, ultimately removed the protector commenting that:
“the evidence of the breakdown in relationships and how that had
resulted in the K Trust’s affairs not being progressed
as perhaps otherwise they would have been, in my judgment,
satisfies the test and justifies the making of an order for
removal”.
So what are the practical implications for trustees and
beneficiaries?
Well, for trustees:
1. Maintain clear communication with beneficiaries and
co-trustees.
2. Document decision-making processes thoroughly.
3. Be prepared to justify actions in terms of beneficiaries'
best interests.
For beneficiaries:
1. Consider alternative dispute resolution before seeking
court intervention.
2. Be prepared to demonstrate how trustee removal serves the
trust's purposes.
The landscape of trustee removal is evolving, with courts taking
a more nuanced and holistic approach. While the fundamental
principles remain stable, there is an increased focus on
practical outcomes and the overall health of trust relationships.
Practitioners and trustees must stay attuned to these
developments to provide the best advice to trustees and
beneficiaries alike.