Print this article
The ABC of KYC
Emma Radmore
Dentons
28 February 2014
At all regulated firms, compliance
problems are constantly growing and evolving. In the UK, the
Financial Conduct Authority's recent spate of thematic reviews (and
the resulting enforcement notices) has revealed a redoubled
regulatory interest in the risks that specific market sectors pose to
the fight against dirty money. Emma Radmore from Dentons considers
the wide-ranging implications of a private bank's or asset-manager's
duty to know its customer and the consequences if one piece of the
jigsaw is missing.
All
the pieces of the jigsaw together Private banking and wealth management
businesses take a variety of forms, but in principle at least they
all have several things in common – in particular the nature of the
customers for their services and the products and services that those
customers typically want. If we look at the KYC problem in the
most reductionistic way, two branches of regulation dominate the
scene, regardless of the business model: financial crime prevention; and conduct-of-business issues. In each of these categories there is
a vast array of rules and guidance – and not just from the FCA –
with which firms must grapple in their attempts to come up with a
holistic approach to compliance and compliance monitoring which
complies with both the vaguest principles and the most detailed,
involved minutiae to be found in rules. Financial
crime prevention Firms are always struggling to comply
with the diverse requirements of both the law – they can be and
often are sued for negligence – and of regulatory expectation. As
they attempt to make a success of this balancing act, they focus
mainly on ensuring that the correct amount of 'customer due
diligence' (CDD, a term that the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision invented at the beginning of the century in its desire to
come up with a synonym for KYC) takes place at the outset of the
relationship with each customer and at periodic stages thereafter if
this is called for. But in terms of legal and regulatory
requirements, every private bank or asset management firm should have
a checklist to ensure that it observes the right standards for: enforcing sanctions; the prevention of money
laundering, both in terms of CDD and in the reporting and handling
of suspicions; the prevention of bribery and
corruption; and dealing with fraud – and we
should note here that new media are constantly evolving and
presenting fraudsters with opportunities to impersonate their
victims and defraud them in new ways. Some of these present more challenges
than others. Let us take each in turn. Sanctions Compliance with the laws that govern
financial sanctions demands an approach that differs from other
financial crime compliance, largely because risk management and the
general weighing-up of regulatory risks is not called for at all. The
patchwork of primary and secondary legislation that makes up the UK's
sanctions regime demands that no person should make funds or economic
resources available to any person on the consolidated list, or for
the benefit of any such person, or do anything to circumvent these
restrictions. It is an offence to make such funds or resources
available in the knowledge (or having reasonable cause to suspect)
that this is so. And this is only the UK sanctions; many firms find
themselves legally or commercially obliged to take account of the
sanctions regimes of other countries in their compliance programmes. What does this mean for firms?
Obviously it means that they ought to know their direct customers and
should also undertake a reasonable assessment of any other person who
may benefit. If the customer is a trust or special purpose vehicle,
or if the direct customer or beneficiary is a high-net-worth overseas
'national' or resident, or if a politically exposed person (PEP) is
involved, the firm in question must do extensive research. The more
research it has to do, the greater the risk it runs of battling
against secrecy laws and customers who are unwilling to provide it
with the details for which it asks. Once the firm has decided whom not to
provide with funds or economic resources, it ought to think of how to
prove to the regulators that it has no way of knowing or reasonably
suspecting that it is providing the wrong people or firms with those
things. Although nothing in the relevant British law explicitly
requires any firm to follow a screening policy, this is obviously the
only reliable way in which it can defend itself against an allegation
that it has flouted sanctions in the event that its funds have been
proven to have found their way into the hands of a
government-blacklisted person such as a US 'specially designated
national.' Every firm should long ago have been disabused of such
misconceptions as, for example, the idea that no screening is
required if its customers have dropped below a certain number, or
that screening need not take place because no resident or citizen of
the UK on its books is also on the sanctions lists, or that its
obligation to screen customers applies only to specific products. The Financial Conduct Authority's
“Financial Crime Guide” makes the regulator's expectations clear.
It is up to financial institutions how (and how often) they screen
people and firms, but their decisions must be made and supported at
the highest levels. To that extent, and that extent only, can, and
indeed should, they base their decisions on assessments of risk. The
guide also makes it clear that the FCA expects to see human
involvement at least at some level. It expects firms to ensure that
their screening software is calibrated properly. Finally, it tells
firms never to assume anything – and particularly never to assume
that they need not conduct screening because other firms in the
so-called 'customer chain' have probably done so already. Money-laundering control is usually
the first compliance issue that springs to mind in private banking
and wealth management. This is hardly surprising when one thinks of
the high fines that regulators have levied against private banks for
poor anti-money-laundering (AML) systems and controls. Firms have to
obtain the right information to understand both their customers and
the customers' businesses or investment needs and profile. In this
sector, this can be difficult for many reasons, including some
already mentioned above. Key obstacles can come with: opaque trust-based structures,
often in tax havens; relationships with PEPs; reluctance to divulge
information, whether because of bank secrecy or confidentiality laws
in other jurisdictions or simply because of cultural differences;
and known links to jurisdictions
where corruption is prevalent. In view of the nature of the
services, the relationship manager will also often become close to
the client. This can cause problems if he or she becomes reluctant to
dig out 'awkward' information or turns a blind eye to activity that
may merit further investigation and possibly a suspicious transaction
report (STR). If an STR is made, the nature of the private bank's
relationship with the customer could also make the job of dealing
with the customer while waiting for a response from the National
Crime Agency (NCA) difficult, in terms of striking the line between
compliance with ethical standards and 'tipping off'. The relationship
manager is clearly the crucial figure in his firm's attempts to apply
the correct levels of CDD and monitoring. It is important for the
firm to understand the customer's aims and his preference for any
unusual structures if it wants to decide whether there is a genuine
reason for opacity and to establish the ultimate beneficial owner(s).
These concerns, according to the Joint Money Laundering Steering
Group (JMLSG) Guidance (which provides an in-depth, official
interpretation of the Money Laundering
Regulations 1993, as amended many times),
dictate that wealth management CDD must perforce take place at a more
detailed level than 'normal' retail banking diligence. Firms whose
customer relationship
begins with a more low-risk service should have systems and controls
in place to react to any change in the relationship. Such a change
might occur if, for example, the firm starts to provide more risky
services. Added to this, a high proportion of
wealth management business may take place with no face-to-face
contact, which brings with it a greater need to guard against
impersonation fraud and the other 'cyber-criminal' risks that this
business presents. Bribery and corruption risk Firms' risks from bribery and
corruption commonly focus on the distribution chain. However, no-one
should discount the risk that clients may pose. As we have seen, many
wealth management clients are based in, or have strong links with,
jurisdictions that are traditionally at the mercy of corrupt
practices. Firms must always be aware that if they deal with funds
that a client has obtained as a result of corruption, there is a risk
that they will be held to have handled laundered funds and therefore
to have committed a money-laundering offence. For that reason, it is
important that any KYC or CDD directed at clients should take the
risk the firm runs of being exposed to corruption into account. Additionally, firms should be aware
of the risks they take on when they offer gifts or hospitality to
clients who are PEPs. They must, at least, ensure that such a
client's PEP connections are not relevant to the entertainment that
he or she is receiving (for example if the PEP is a foreign public
official and the firm is tendering to provide services to that PEP's
governmental department). Fraud and other risks The FCA undertook a thematic review
in August 2013 that set out the main risks that mobile banking and
payments present. The resulting report, which is of particular
relevance to the private wealth sector, noted that new risks have
arisen with the increase in m-commerce and m-payments. Not all of the
risks are the same as those of internet banking and the review noted
specific dangers in relation to: fraud – for both firms and
customers, but the FCA is concerned mainly with the risk of fraud
against consumers; security and the risk of malware
and viruses; the use of third parties,
specifically in the chain of responsibility for problems or losses
that occur; consumer awareness and
understanding, with the FCA being very concerned that the smaller
screens and limited keypads of smartphones and tablets might make
consumers more likely to err; risk of IT failure and service
interruption; and anti-money laundering systems
and controls, particularly when mobile banking services are not
linked to the customer's current account. The FCA's plan was to visit a sample
of high street banks and other firms that provided mobile banking
services to assess the ways in which they were trying to offset these
risks. The regulator will report again on the subject in mid-2014 but
in the meantime encourages all providers to consider the risks and
how to offset them. The
FCA's worries The FCA has recently made its
concerns clear in the thematic review on AML and anti-bribery and
corruption (ABC) systems and controls that it published in October
2013. For the review, it focused on 22 firms in the asset management
and platform sector, but many of the concerns it uncovered there are
bound to apply equally to the private banking and wealth management
sector. The report notes the specific AML and ABC risks in the
sector, including: non face-to-face business; customers from, or with links
to, highly risky jurisdictions; wealthy or powerful clients; the use of offshore structures; large or unexpected
transactions; and unexplained payments to third
parties. The FCA was disappointed with the
results of the review. It found some good practices but said that it
had expected the industry to have done more to evolve suitable
systems and controls. It was particularly concerned about
inadequacies at firms that were part of larger financial groups, some
of which had previously attracted regulatory attention. Among the key
concerns were: their inability to show that
senior managers were overseeing things and challenging whatever they
did not like; the tendency of firms to deal
with AML and bribery and corruption risks as a compliance matter
rather than as part of proactive risk management; the absence at some firms of
proper controls to record the risks posed by new customers, which
meant that enhanced due diligence (EDD) did not always take place
when it should; the frequent inability of firms
to measure and monitor the risks they identified; a tendency to regard a
long-standing relationship as a substitute for keeping 'due
diligence' up to date; a frequent failure to check the
source of funds properly; a frequent failure to
demonstrate the existence of adequate systems and controls for
assessing bribery and corruption risks in third-party relationships;
and an absence of properly tailored
training programmes. The FCA said that it expected all
firms to consider these findings and take action to improve their AML
and bribery and corruption prevention systems and controls where
necessary. It plans to 'follow up' with some firms. Conduct-of-business
risks Financial crime prevention, however,
is not the only KYC-type concern for the sector. Increasingly, the
FCA is focusing on compliance with its principles (both the
“statements of principle and code of practice for approved persons”
or APER and the “principles for business” or PRIN) and several
specific conduct-of-business (COBS) rules relating to fair dealings
with customers. Firms ought to consider, in particular: the post Retail Distribution
Review (RDR) rules, when advising on retail investment products. In
particular, each firm must ensure that it is providing customers
with the right disclosures at the right times, that it is clear what
range of providers and products its model includes, and that the
charging structure is clear and compliant; inducements
and conflicts of interest, especially where the advisory firm is
receiving products, services or other benefits from a third party,
be it a product provider, platform provider or other intermediary.
Also, the role of the relationship manager is important here – it
is particularly vital that the manager should not be given any
monetary incentive to turn a blind eye to potential financial crime
issues or to recommend unsuitable or potentially unsuitable
products; and the rules on suitability and
appropriateness. In several recent enforcement actions the FCA has
demonstrated that it will not hesitate to take action if it feels
customers have been sold products or in an inappropriate way or have
been sold unsuitable products. Add to this the recent additional
restrictions on the promotion of unregulated collective investment
schemes, and the newly expressed concerns of the European Securities
and Markets Authority that firms are not complying properly with the
requirements of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
(MiFID) when selling complex products, and the potential for
misselling widens considerably. Of course, further change is afoot.
Those firms that include regulated mortgages within their product
range must prepare for compliance with the significantly changed
rules the mortgage market review (MMR) will bring from the end of
April, and those that include consumer credit and related services
will be preparing to adapt to FCA regulation from the beginning of
April. And that is even without considering the changes close to
agreement in the EU, in particular the changes to MiFID, the
Insurance Mediation Directive and the new Packaged Retail Investment
Products (PRIPs) Regulation. Conduct-of-business:
the FCA's worries Also in October, John Griffith-Jones
of the FCA spoke to the Wealth Management Association about the
regulator's crusade to protect consumers – including high-net-worth
individuals – from sharp practice. He focused on the importance of
good business models, especially those that placed great importance
on 'consumer interest', and said that the FCA would be looking at: the consequences of the Retail
Distribution Review (RDR) and in particular how firms are filling
the "advice gap"; suitability, with a particular
emphasis on firms keeping documents that show that they have
considered suitability properly; and compliance with
anti-money-laundering (AML) requirements. As we have seen many times, the FCA
is always looking to see how firms can produce evidence that they
have complied with suitability requirements. The extended 'skilled
persons' powers introduced in April 2013 may give the regulator more
opportunities to conduct in-depth compliance reviews at firms. The message from the FCA, then, is
clear. It wants to see compliance, but it wants that compliance to be
holistic and in line with each firm's risk management strategies and
policies. Firms must assess the risks to their businesses from many
angles and must then design policies and procedures that are 'fit for
purpose'. For services and products commonly offered by private
bankers and wealth managers, this means getting and keeping a
thorough understanding of who the clients are, what they want, and
how they want to achieve it. The information firms keep, and the way
they analyse that information, is crucial both to the prevention of
and fight against financial crime and to the UK's conduct-of-business
rules. Enforcement notices to date in this field have focused on
poor AML controls (particularly regarding PEPs) and, increasingly, on
suitability. There is no sign of any let-up in principles-based
enforcement and the recent reviews and speeches we have mentioned
should give firms an indication of where FCA is planning to focus its
supervisory resources. * Emma
Radmore (Managing Associate) is a member of Dentons’ Financial
Services and Funds practice in London. She can be reached on
+44 (0)20 7246 7000 or at emma.radmore@dentons.com.