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Cayman’s recent fund governance SORP
Neal Lomax
Mourant Ozannes
14 February 2014
The Cayman Islands Monetary Authority’s
recently-published statement of guidance on matters of fund
governance has taken effect and applies to all funds regulated under
the terms of the Mutual Funds Law. Neal Lomax of Mourant Ozannes tell
us how. The statement establishes key
principles of good governance which must be observed by funds which
CIMA regulates. Many funds will not be phased by the requirements of
the statement for their governance models will exceed the standards
which the statement demands, though others may find the statement
challenging and should seek to improve their governance standards
accordingly. The statement is neither rigid nor
prescriptive (and not exhaustive either). Instead, it sets out key
principles to be interpreted and applied in the specific context of
each fund, taking into account factors such as the fund’s
structure, complexity and size. It aims its requirements at the
‘governing body’ of a fund (I.e. its governing mind and will and
the body responsible for overseeing and supervising the activities
and affairs of the fund) as well as at its ‘operators’ i.e. the
members who, together, comprise the fund’s governing body). Beyond fiduciary duties: a
regulatory overlay It is clear from the statement that
CIMA seeks to ensure that fund governance not only becomes a focus
beyond common law fiduciary duties but also that it is contextually
relevant. CIMA also wishes to say who bears
responsibility for governance and concedes that its supervisory glare
falls upon a broad community (hence the different treatment in the
statement of the fund’s operators from its governing body) which
must have regard to broader principles than those established as
rules of common law or guidelines established in Weavering Macro
Fixed Income Fund Limited (in liquidation) v Stefan Peterson
and Hans Ekstrom (2011). The oversight principle. The
requirement of the statement for effective supervision and oversight
of a fund’s activities and affairs by its governing body is
entirely consistent with the general requirements of supervision
imposed by common law (and highlighted in the Weavering judgment as
being absent in the case of the Weavering fund). In many ways this is
at the heart of the statement and underpins the other principles
which it establishes, and includes a requirement that the governing
body of a fund should meet at least twice per year or more frequently
if the circumstances of the fund require it to do so in order to
fulfil its responsibilities effectively. The documents principle. The
statement highlights the need for funds to ensure that they provide
investors with accurate and sufficient disclosure of matters such as
the fund’s investment strategy, relevant conflicts of interests and
descriptions of the equity interests being offered to investors. In
large measure these replicate the requirements of the Mutual Funds
Law, though the statement goes further in requiring that internal
documents are maintained which record fully, accurately and clearly
the proceedings at meetings of the fund’s governing body. The communication principle. The
statement notes that communication between the operators of a fund
and its service-providers (as well as between funds and CIMA) should
contain reports about compliance with the rules of the fund as well
as with applicable law and regulation and should also allow investors
to see this information whenever disclosure to them is appropriate. The risk management principle. the
statement requires a fund’s risks to be appropriately managed and
mitigated and discussed at the (at least) biannual meetings of the
fund’s governing body. The enforcement dilemma The statement may be a double-edged
sword for CIMA; much as it encourages good governance among fund
operators and governing bodies, investors are bound to expect that
compliance with it will be policed and shortcomings dealt with.
Whether CIMA will in fact do this remains to be seen; for the time
being, it lacks a specific statutory right of enforcement in the
event of failure by fund operators and governing bodies to adhere to
the terms of the statement. However, any conclusions which CIMA
reaches about bad behaviour will colour the way it exercise its of
its statutory power of substitution where fund operators fall short
of what CIMA considers to be fit and proper. * Neal Lomax is the managing partner
in Mourant Ozannes’ Cayman office. He can be reached on +1 345 814
9131 or at neal.lomax@mourantozannes.com