The paper, by the for example.)

Governments such as those of the UK have pushed for public registers of beneficial owners of companies and trusts, concerned that the existence of little-known structures for holding firms and personal wealth is a political hot-button issue. The arrival of the , a network of agreements by dozens of countries to exchange data to hunt down alleged tax evaders, is a further major step to squeeze dirty money. The US is not signed up to that system, but its FATCA rules have clamped down on expat Americans’ financial lives.

Debate over such centres often sees charges of hypocrisy. The US, which has chased after Swiss bank accounts, for example, arguably has tax havens within its borders in the states of Delaware and New Hampshire, for example, and with arguably less reporting transparency than among certain IFCs. The UK, with its non-domiciled residency system and tax breaks for foreign investors, is also a sort of haven, although the non-dom rules have been tightened and taxes have risen. Dozens of countries operate “golden visa” citizenship-by-investment schemes, enabling high net worth persons to buy passports.

(Editor’s note: Even without bank secrecy and other practices no longer deemed acceptable, the globalised business world and existence of millions of expat professionals means there will be a need for IFCs, as they offer clusters of expertise, and avoid double-taxation problems. So long as they are transparent, it is hard to see how the world economy is harmed by their existence. And to the extent that they remain a problem, the logical step for governments in major countries is cutting and simplifying their own taxes. The examples of Singapore and Hong Kong are instructive: low marginal tax rates, but strong economies with revenue to pay for public services. Alas, it is easier to lash out at "tax havens" than to get one’s own house in order.)